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a b s t r a c t
Motor control strongly relies on neural processes that predict the sensory consequences of self-
generated actions. Previous research has demonstrated deﬁcits in such sensory-predictive processes in
schizophrenic patients and these low-level deﬁcits are thought to contribute to the emergence of delu-
sions of control. Here, we examined the extent to which individual differences in sensory prediction are
associatedwith a tendency towardsdelusional ideation inhealthyparticipants.Weuseda force-matchingeywords:
otor control
elusions
ensory prediction
chizophrenia
chizotypy
task to quantify sensory-predictive processes, and administered questionnaires to assess schizotypy and
delusion-like thinking. Individuals with higher levels of delusional ideation showed more accurate force
matching suggesting that such thinking is associated with a reduced tendency to predict and attenuate
the sensory consequences of self-generated actions. These results suggest that deﬁcits in sensory predic-
tion in schizophrenia are not simply consequences of the deluded state and are not related to neuroleptic
medication. Rather they appear to be stable, trait-like characteristics of an individual, a ﬁnding that has
r our
 important implications fo
. Introduction
Predicting the sensory consequences of self-generated action
s a key component of motor control (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001).
f particular importance in the current context is the notion
hat the sensory predictions that are thought to arise from an
fference copy of the motor command form a basis for action
ttribution. Speciﬁcally, if the predicted sensation of a movement
orresponds to the actual sensory feedback – as is the case with
elf-generated actions – we experience agency. By contrast, a mis-
atch between prediction and sensation suggests an external
ource. An additional aspect of this prediction process is that the
redicted sensory consequences of an action are subtracted from
he actual feedback, partially canceling out sensory changes that
re due to self-generated movement (Bays, Flanagan, & Wolpert,
006; Bays and Wolpert, 2007; Bays, Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2005;
lakemore,Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; Lindner, Haarmeier, Erb, Grodd,
Thier, 2006; Shergill, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2003). This cancel-
ation attenuates predicted sensation, thereby accentuating more
elevant unpredicted sensory information. Predictive attenuation
xplains why the tactile stimulation that we perceive when we
∗ Corresponding author at: Brain Mapping Unit, Behavioural and Clinical Neuro-
cience Institute, Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, Downing Site,
B2 3EB Cambridge, UK. Tel.: +44 1223 764 673; fax: +44 1223 333 564.
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Open access under CC BY license. understanding of the neurocognitive basis of delusions.
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touch ourselves is weaker than the same stimulus externally
imposed (Bays and Wolpert, 2007; Bays et al., 2005, 2006; Shergill
et al., 2003) or why we cannot tickle ourselves (Blakemore et al.,
1998).
Deﬁcits in sensory-predictive processes have been linked to
speciﬁc symptoms in psychopathology, most notably delusions of
control in schizophrenic patients (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert,
2000; Lindner, Thier, Kircher, Haarmeier, & Leube, 2005; Shergill,
Samson, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2005; Synofzik, Thier, Leube,
Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010). Patients suffering from such delu-
sions experience their own actions as being made for them by an
external agent rather than by their own will. Intriguingly, how-
ever, the actions that are experienced as forced upon them are in
linewith the patient’s intentions. The deﬁcits underlying delusions
of control are thus not related to an inability to initiate an intended
action but to register this action as internally triggered. Speciﬁ-
cally, it is thought that a failure to predict the sensory consequences
of one’s own actions leads to a mismatch or prediction-error so
that actual sensory feedback is surprising, resulting in the feel-
ing that the action was not internally generated. Persistence of
prediction-error would lead to a reduced sense of agency, which is
especially noteworthy given that many of the ﬁrst-rank symptoms
Open access under CC BY license.of schizophrenia seem to reﬂect external attributions of internally
generated phenomena (Fletcher & Frith, 2009).
Although there is evidence that schizophrenic patients show
deﬁcits in predicting the sensory consequences of self-generated
actions (Lindner et al., 2005; Shergill et al., 2005; Synofzik et al.,
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010), such case–control studies can be problematic due to med-
cation effects. A complementary approach to exploring such
ymptom models involves assessing schizotypal characteristics in
ealthy people, treating schizophrenia as an extreme expression
f a continuous phenotype normally distributed in the population
Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad, & Zinser, 1994; Claridge,
994; Crow, 1998; Meehl, 1962; Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety,
004; Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999). Besides being of inherent
mportance for the conceptualization of schizophrenia, such an
ndividual-differences approach offers new ways of testing mod-
ls of symptoms in the absence of medication. The approach may
lso provide an opportunity to distinguish between state-like and
rait-like contributions to symptoms.
In this study,we explored the sensory-predictionmodel of delu-
ions using an established force-matching task (Bays & Wolpert,
007; Bays et al., 2005, 2006; Shergill et al., 2003), designed to
uantify the degree of sensory attenuation arising from predic-
ive processes. We related variability in predictive attenuation to
elusion-proneness and schizotypy in healthy participants. Given
he deﬁcits in sensory prediction seen in schizophrenic patients
Lindner et al., 2005; Shergill et al., 2005; Synofzik et al., 2010), we
redicted a negative correlation between levels of sensory predic-
ion and the tendency towards delusional ideation.
. Methods
.1. Participants
Thirty healthy participants (18 women; age range 18–25 years) gave written,
nformedconsent. Twosubjectswereexcluded following testingdue toperformance
n the force-matching task deviating from the group mean more than 2 standard
eviations. The remaining participants were manly right-handed; the mean score
n the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldﬁeld, 1971) was 73.7 (S.E. 6.5).
.2. Force-matching procedure
In the force-matching task (Shergill et al., 2003) a force was applied to the par-
icipants’ right index ﬁnger by a lever that was attached to a torque motor (Fig. 1).
ubjects subsequently had to match this passively experienced target force by one
f two means: Either they used their left index ﬁnger to directly exert force onto
he lever, pressing onto their right index ﬁnger (“Finger condition”); or else they
ontrolled the lever indirectly by sliding a linear potentiometer that controlled
he torque motor (“Slider condition”; the gain of the slider was 0.5N/cm). In the
inger condition, central processes in the brain can use an efference copy of the
otor command in order to predict and attenuate the sensory consequences of the
ovement. The attenuationof thepredicted sensation canbemeasured as overcom-
ensation when participants try to match the sensation of a previous force. In other
ords, because sensation in the Finger condition can be predicted, and is therefore
ttenuated, participants should consistently apply a larger force onto their ﬁnger
ig. 1. The force-matching task. (A) The force actuator consisted of a lever attached to a
easured the force applied to the subject’s ﬁnger. In the ﬁrst part of each trial, the actua
ach trial, the subject was required to match the target force. (B) In the Finger conditio
n the top of the lever with their right index ﬁnger. In this condition, the brain can pred
f the motor command and attenuate the predicted sensation. Depending on the extent
atch the percept of the previously experienced target force. (C) In the Slider condition
otentiometer which controlled the force generated by the actuator. Here, no sensory p
onsequences.ia 48 (2010) 4169–4172
when trying to match the percept of the passively experienced target force (Bays
& Wolpert, 2007; Bays et al., 2005, 2006; Shergill et al., 2003). The Slider condition
serves as a control due to the unusual relationship between the action (moving the
slider in the horizontal plane) and its sensory consequences (feeling a force applied
to one ﬁnger of the other hand). Because participants have no prior experience with
the slider, and exposure during the experiment is limited to 80 trials, there should
be no or almost no predictive processes to attenuate perception. Participants should
thus be able to match the force more accurately than in the Finger condition.
All subjects completed 80 trials in each condition. Ten different target forces (8
trials of each), increasing in increments of 0.25N from 0.50N to 2.75N, were ran-
domly presented. The order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants.
2.3. Questionnaires
Participants completed the 21-itemPeters et al. Delusion Inventory (PDI) (Peters
et al., 2004) and the Magical Ideation Scale (MgI) (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Both
of these inventories are schizotypy scales speciﬁcally designed to quantify delusion-
like ideas in the general population. One-tailed tests were used in view of the clear
predictions relating sensory prediction and delusional ideation.
In a more exploratory analysis, we investigated perceptual aberrations and the
sense of internal versus external control related to events in everyday life. Each
participant completed the 35-item Perceptual Aberration Scale (PAS) (Chapman,
Chapman, & Raulin, 1978) and a Locus of Control questionnaire (LC) (Levenson,
1973). The latter quantiﬁes the extent to which participants localize control over
important events in everyday life internally (“Internal”) or attribute it externally
either to chance (“External Chance”) or to a powerful other person (“External
Other”). The inﬂuence of handedness on performance in the force-matching task is
unknown. Nevertheless, in order to control for any potential effects, the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (EHI) (Oldﬁeld, 1971) was also completed.
Normality of all behavioral andpsychometric datawas explored by inspection of
normal Q–Q plots and by using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test with Lilliefors correc-
tions. To allowuniform analyses, skewed datawere subjected either to a square root
transformation if they were positively skewed (MgI and PAS) or a reversed square
root transformation if they were negatively skewed (EHI).
3. Results
3.1. Sensory prediction
Consistent with previous results (Shergill et al., 2003), when
trying to match a passively experienced target force, participants
applied a larger force in the Finger condition than the Slider
condition (Fig. 2A).Acomparisonof the regression linesof the force-
matching performance of each participant indicated that both the
intercept (paired-sample t-test, t=−3.70, df=27, p≤ .001) and the
slope (t=−4.14, df=27, p≤ .001) were signiﬁcantly larger in the
Finger than the Slider condition. Across participants, the intercept
increased on average by 0.33N (S.E. 0.08N) and the slope by 41%
(S.E. 12%).
torque motor which was under computer control. A sensor at the end of the lever
tor generated a target force on the subject’s left index ﬁnger. In the second part of
n, the subject was required to directly match the target force by actively pressing
ict the sensory consequences of the ﬁnger movement based on an efference copy
of this predictive attenuation, a larger active force is therefore required in order to
, the subject was required to indirectly match the target force by moving a linear
rediction is possible due to the unusual relationship between action and sensory
C. Teufel et al. / Neuropsychologia 48 (2010) 4169–4172 4171
F prese
a ct per
t tive p
b ercom
3
s
c
c
w
q
s
i
a
q
a
t
s
s
(
l
c
p
f
N
s
c
i
3
r
o
n
r
p
h
4
r
m
pig. 2. (A) Mean force (±S.E.) applied by the participants as a function of the mean
nd those of the Slider condition by white squares. The dotted line indicates perfe
han the previously experienced target force) is a direct measure of sensory-predic
y the PDI) as a function of their sensory prediction (as measured by their mean ov
.2. Relation between sensory prediction and delusional ideation
Given that the PDI and the MgI are both measures of delu-
ional ideation, it is unsurprising that a partial correlation analysis
ontrolled for handedness showed that their scores were signiﬁ-
antly related to each other (r= .46, p≤ .01), a ﬁnding consistent
ith previous studies (Peters et al., 1999). In order to relate the
uestionnaires to sensory prediction, we calculated a composite
core for each participant in the force-matching task by subtract-
ng the average force applied in the Slider condition from that
pplied in the Finger condition. This overcompensation measure
uantiﬁes the degree of sensory prediction. A partial correlation
nalysis controlled for handedness showed no relation between
he participants’ transformed MgI scores and their overcompen-
ation scores (r=−.25, n.s., one-tailed). PDI scores, however, were
igniﬁcantly negatively correlated with overcompensation scores
r=−.42, p= .015, one-tailed) (Fig. 2B). A Kendall’s partial corre-
ation controlled for handedness, which is insensitive to outliers,
onﬁrmed this ﬁnding (Kendall’s Tau=−0.25, p<0.05, one-tailed).
-Values were estimated based on 1000 permutations.
Given that the PDI and the MgI are non-independent, Bon-
erroni correction would be inappropriate and too conservative.
ote, however, that the signiﬁcant relation between overcompen-
ation and PDI would survive even such correction and would
onsequently survive any correction that would take the non-
ndependence into account.
.3. Perceptual aberration and locus of control
There was no relationship between aberrant perceptual expe-
iences (as measured by the transformed PAS scores) and
vercompensation scores (r= .01, n.s.). Analysis of the LC question-
aire indicated no relation with any of the subscales (Internal:
= .05, n.s.; External Chance: r= .07, n.s.; External Other: r=−.35,
= 0.077). Again, the analyses are partial correlations controlled for
andedness.
. DiscussionOur study demonstrates a signiﬁcant relationship between
educed prediction of the sensory consequences of self-generated
ovement and a tendency towards delusional ideation in healthy
articipants: the more accurate participants were in matching annted target force. Results of the Finger condition are represented by dark squares
formance. The amount of overcompensation (i.e., the application of a larger force
rocesses. (B) The participants’ tendency towards delusional ideation (as measured
pensation score).
experienced force (i.e. the lower their predictive attenuation), the
higher they scored on the PDI. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
notion that a continuum between health and psychosis extends
even to a basic sensory level.
It is perhaps unsurprising that sensory prediction correlated
with delusional ideation asmeasured by the PDI but not by theMgI,
given that the latter has been criticized for under- as well as over-
estimating delusional ideation in the general population (Peters
et al., 2004). The PDI was constructed to resolve the problems of
the MgI and to provide a more accurate measure of delusional
ideation in healthy participants (Peters et al., 1999, 2004). None
of our exploratory analyses regarding perceptual aberration or the
patients’ localization of control showed a signiﬁcant result, high-
lighting the speciﬁcity of the relation between deﬁcits in sensory
prediction and delusional ideation.
Althoughonly longitudinal data canprovidedeﬁnitive evidence,
our results suggest that deﬁcits in sensory prediction represent
a stable, trait-like characteristic of individuals, varying continu-
ously in the general population. Given that the abnormal sensory
experiences associatedwith such deﬁcits are thought to contribute
critically to the emergence of delusions of control in patients
(Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Frith et al., 2000; Lindner et al., 2005;
Shergill et al., 2005; Synofzik et al., 2010), this characteristic may
predispose to certain styles of reasoning and types of experience
in healthy people, which in turn may ultimately predispose to
the emergence of delusions under certain circumstances. Further-
more, our results suggest that the deﬁcient sensory-predictive
processes in psychosis shown by previous studies (Lindner et al.,
2005; Shergill et al., 2005; Synofzik et al., 2010) are unlikely to be
a confound of neuroleptic medication.
As with previous studies, participants were able to match an
experienced force accurately when they used the slider to control
the lever that pushed onto their passive ﬁnger, indicating that they
did not predict and attenuate the sensory consequences of their
action in this condition. An interesting question for future research
iswhether extensive experiencewith the sliderwould allowpartic-
ipants to incorporate thepredictive relationbetween thepositionof
the slider and the experienced force into their sensory predictions.
Over time, this should lead to increasing sensory attenuation and
consequently to overcompensation even in the slider condition.
Alternatively, an additional requirement for sensory attenuation
might be that the relation between an action and its sensory con-
sequences conforms to a physically plausible causal scenario, in
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Synofzik, M., Thier, P., Leube, D. T., Schlotterbeck, P., & Lindner, A. (2010). Misattri-172 C. Teufel et al. / Neuropsy
hich case no change in sensory prediction and attenuation should
e seen in the slider condition even after extensive training.
To conclude, the ﬁnding that variability in sensory prediction
haracterizes the general population, and is related to delusional
deation, supports the sensory-prediction model of delusions and
omplements work with psychotic patients (Lindner et al., 2005;
hergill et al., 2005; Synofzik et al., 2010). More generally, this
bservation highlights the usefulness of an individual-differences
pproach to assess speciﬁc symptommodels of schizophrenia. This
pens up exciting possibilities for future work to characterize the
eural signature of fundamental processes that contribute to this
ental illness using imaging techniques and to track their neurode-
elopmental trajectory.
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